Abstract
"First, Do No Harm: An Identity Salience Model of Analyst Recommendations and Corporate Governance"
Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, Vol.2013(1), p.10955
01/2013
DOI: 10.5465/ambpp.2013.10955abstract
Abstract
Abstract only
Research on securities analysts’ recommendations has generally assumed that analysts act as external monitors of corporate governance practices at the firms they cover. The boundaries of this assumption have yet to be tested, however. We theorize that analysts’ identity as monitors of corporate governance is nested within their broader identity as monitors of firm performance. As such, analysts will respond negatively to weak corporate governance, but only if firm performance is also weak. We test this theory using both a lab experiment with MBA student participants and an analysis of archival data consisting of actual analysts’ recommendations for publicly traded stocks. Both methodological approaches produced results strongly supporting our theory. Analysts rated stocks with weak corporate governance lower than they rated stocks with strong corporate governance, but only if the stock’s performance was also weak. We discuss the theoretical implications of this finding at length.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- "First, Do No Harm: An Identity Salience Model of Analyst Recommendations and Corporate Governance"
- Creators
- Ryan Adam Krause - Texas Christian UniversityTimothy D. Maynes - University at Buffalo, State University of New YorkMatthew Semadeni - Indiana University
- Resource Type
- Abstract
- Publication Details
- Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, Vol.2013(1), p.10955
- DOI
- 10.5465/ambpp.2013.10955abstract
- eISSN
- 2151-6561
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/2013
- Academic Unit
- Management and Entrepreneurship
- Record Identifier
- 9984937787802771
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