Abstract
The Best of Both Worlds? Examining the Performance Consequences of Executive Board Chairs
Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, Vol.2020(1), p.10227
08/2020
DOI: 10.5465/AMBPP.2020.10227abstract
Abstract
Abstract only
Agency theory views the proper role of the board chair exclusively as providing independent oversight to monitor and control the CEO. Recently, firms have introduced an innovation in board leadership that confounds this view. The executive board chair, a governance hybrid involved in both strategy and oversight, challenges agency theory’s prescription that the two remain separate. We argue that executive board chairs can contribute the necessary expertise for effective governance without the conflict of interest associated with CEO duality—and therefore generate stronger performance. We also argue that the performance advantage differs depending on the type of agency problem most in need of mitigation (i.e., principal-agent or principal-principal). Analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2003 to 2017 provides general support for our arguments."
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- The Best of Both Worlds? Examining the Performance Consequences of Executive Board Chairs
- Creators
- Ryan Adam Krause - Texas Christian UniversityRob Langan - University Hospital of GenevaMarkus Menz - University Hospital of Geneva
- Resource Type
- Abstract
- Publication Details
- Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, Vol.2020(1), p.10227
- DOI
- 10.5465/AMBPP.2020.10227abstract
- eISSN
- 2151-6561
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 08/2020
- Academic Unit
- Management and Entrepreneurship
- Record Identifier
- 9984937785702771
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