Book
Pieces of mind: the proper domain of psychological predicates
Oxford University Press
2018
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198809524.001.0001
Abstract
Carrie Figdor presents a critical assessment of how psychological terms are used to describe the non-human biological world. She argues against the anthropocentric attitude which takes human cognition as the standard against which non-human capacities are measured, and offers an alternative basis for naturalistic explanation of the mind.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Pieces of mind: the proper domain of psychological predicates
- Creators
- Carrie Figdor - University of Iowa, Philosophy
- Resource Type
- Book
- Table of contents
- 5.4 Dennett and Searle Respond; 5.3 The Literalist Responds; 6.5 Epistemic Metaphor; 9.5 The Fear of Mechanistic Reduction; 3.1 General Remarks; Index; 9.1 General Remarks; Copyright; 4.2 Literalism Elaborated; 3.5 Concluding Remarks; 6: The Metaphor View; Acknowledgments; 4.1 General Remarks; 7.6 Concluding Remarks; 5.2 The Nonsense View; 2.1 General Remarks; 8.4 Discharging Discharging; 9.3 The Short Term: Moral Status and Anthropomorphism; 1.2 Chapter Summaries; 2.2 Background to the Semantic Problem; 2.5 Concluding Remarks; 8.2 Homuncular Functionalism and Mechanistic Explanation; Contents; 9.4 The Long Term: Moral Status and Anthropocentrism; 7.4 The Second Variant: Exsanguinated Properties; 3.2 Models and Meaning: The Lotka–Volterra Model; 6.6 Concluding Remarks; 8.1 General Remarks; Dedication; 2: Cases: Qualitative Analogy; 7: The Technical View; 8.3 Seeking a Psychological Exception; 4: Literalism: An Initial Defense; 6.4 The Literalist Responds: Meaning; 10: Concluding Summary; 1.1 General Remarks; 9.6 Concluding Remarks; 6.1 General Remarks; 3.3 Quantitative Analogy: Fruit Flies and the DD Model; 7.1 General Remarks; 7.2 The First Variant: The Technical-Behaviorist; 5: The Nonsense View; 2.3 Qualitative Analogy: Plants; 3: Cases: Quantitative Analogy; 4.3 The Implicit Scare Quoter; 7.3 The Literalist Responds to the First Variant; 9: Literalism and Moral Status; 9.2 Psychological Ascriptions and Moral Status; Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates; 5.5 Concluding Remarks; 7.5 The Literalist Responds to the Second Variant; 5.1 General Remarks; 3.4 Quantitative Analogy: Neurons and the TD Model; 6.3 The Literalist Responds: Motivation; 1.3 Consciousness and Content; 8: Literalism and Mechanistic Explanation; 2.4 Qualitative Analogy: Bacteria; Cover; 8.5 Concluding Remarks; 4.4 Concluding Remarks; 6.2 The Metaphor View; 1: Introduction; Bibliography; Cover -- Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1 General Remarks -- 1.2 Chapter Summaries -- 1.3 Consciousness and Content -- 2: Cases: Qualitative Analogy -- 2.1 General Remarks -- 2.2 Background to the Semantic Problem -- 2.3 Qualitative Analogy: Plants -- 2.4 Qualitative Analogy: Bacteria -- 2.5 Concluding Remarks -- 3: Cases: Quantitative Analogy -- 3.1 General Remarks -- 3.2 Models and Meaning: The Lotka-Volterra Model -- 3.3 Quantitative Analogy: Fruit Flies and the DD Model -- 3.4 Quantitative Analogy: Neurons and the TD Model -- 3.5 Concluding Remarks -- 4: Literalism: An Initial Defense -- 4.1 General Remarks -- 4.2 Literalism Elaborated -- 4.3 The Implicit Scare Quoter -- 4.4 Concluding Remarks -- 5: The Nonsense View -- 5.1 General Remarks -- 5.2 The Nonsense View -- 5.3 The Literalist Responds -- 5.4 Dennett and Searle Respond -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- 6: The Metaphor View -- 6.1 General Remarks -- 6.2 The Metaphor View -- 6.3 The Literalist Responds: Motivation -- 6.4 The Literalist Responds: Meaning -- 6.5 Epistemic Metaphor -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- 7: The Technical View -- 7.1 General Remarks -- 7.2 The First Variant: The Technical-Behaviorist -- 7.3 The Literalist Responds to the First Variant -- 7.4 The Second Variant: Exsanguinated Properties -- 7.5 The Literalist Responds to the Second Variant -- 7.6 Concluding Remarks -- 8: Literalism and Mechanistic Explanation -- 8.1 General Remarks -- 8.2 Homuncular Functionalism and Mechanistic Explanation -- 8.3 Seeking a Psychological Exception -- 8.4 Discharging Discharging -- 8.5 Concluding Remarks -- 9: Literalism and Moral Status -- 9.1 General Remarks -- 9.2 Psychological Ascriptions and Moral Status -- 9.3 The Short Term: Moral Status and Anthropomorphism; 9.4 The Long Term: Moral Status and Anthropocentrism -- 9.5 The Fear of Mechanistic Reduction -- 9.6 Concluding Remarks -- 10: Concluding Summary -- Bibliography -- Index
- DOI
- 10.1093/oso/9780198809524.001.0001
- ISBN
- 0198809522; 9780198809524
- eISBN
- 0192537342; 9780192537348; 0191846864; 9780191846861
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press; Oxford
- Number of pages
- x, 220 pages
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 2018
- Academic Unit
- Iowa Neuroscience Institute; Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9983903694302771
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