Book chapter
292The Evidence in Perception
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, pp.292-306
Routledge handbooks in philosophy, Routledge
2024
DOI: 10.4324/9781315672687-27
Abstract
It is commonly thought that we depend fundamentally on the "evidence of the senses" for our empirical beliefs, including and most directly, our beliefs about our local environment, the spatial world around us. The ultimate evidence we have for our perceptual beliefs is provided in some way by perception or perceptual experience. But what is this evidence? There seem to be three main options: external factualism allows that the evidence include facts about the external world; internal factualism takes facts that involve only the internal, mental world-like facts about one's perceptual experiences or appearances-to count as one's perceptual evidence; and non-factualism takes propositions, including false ones, to count as evidence-for example, propositional contents of appearances or seemings. We shall see that all these options face significant challenges. Some might respond by accepting skepticism: our perceptual beliefs are not epistemically justified. Others might conclude that perceptual beliefs can be justified without depending on evidence. I shall end, however, by tentatively suggesting that there is a sort of internal fact that is a plausible candidate for perceptual evidence that has been overlooked.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- 292The Evidence in Perception
- Creators
- Ali Hasan
- Contributors
- Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (Editor)Clayton Littlejohn (Editor)
- Resource Type
- Book chapter
- Publication Details
- The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, pp.292-306
- Publisher
- Routledge; Abingdon, Oxon
- Series
- Routledge handbooks in philosophy
- DOI
- 10.4324/9781315672687-27
- Alternative title
- The Evidence in Perception
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 2024
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984536727402771
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