Book chapter
Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Preplaycommunication
Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity, pp.129-146
Recent Economic Thought Series, v. 35, Kluwer Academic Publishers
1994
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-1398-4_7
Abstract
As the timely appearance of this volume suggests, the existence of coordination failures in a variety of strategic settings has begun to receive increased attention. Numerous games have been described in which players are required to coordinate their actions in order to reach a mutually advantageous equilibrium. Examples include network externalities (see e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985), product warranties with bilateral moral hazard (Cooper and Ross, 1985) and team production (Bryant, 1983). Recent work on macroeconomic models of imperfectly competitive economies (e.g., Heller, 1986, and Cooper and John, 1988) and search (Diamond, 1982) has also identified the possibility of aggregate coordination failures.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Preplaycommunication
- Creators
- Russell CooperDouglas V. DeJongRobert ForsytheThomas W. Ross
- Contributors
- James W. Friedman (Editor)
- Resource Type
- Book chapter
- Publication Details
- Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity, pp.129-146
- Series
- Recent Economic Thought Series; v. 35
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-94-011-1398-4_7
- ISSN
- 0924-199X
- Publisher
- Kluwer Academic Publishers; Boston
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 1994
- Academic Unit
- Economics; Accounting
- Record Identifier
- 9984963236402771
Metrics
1 Record Views