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Cognition In Spatial Dispersion Games
Book chapter

Cognition In Spatial Dispersion Games

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong and Michael Maier
Experimental Business Research Volume III, pp.185-202
Springer
2005
DOI: 10.1007/0-387-24244-9_8
url
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/facac215-420c-4a02-b2f3-edcf14694e1cView
Open Access

Abstract

In common-interest spatial-dispersion games the agents’ common goal is to choose distinct locations. We experimentally investigate the role of cognition in such games and compare it with the role of cognition in spatial matching games. In our setup cognition matters because agents may be differentially aware of the dispersion opportunities that are created by the history of the game. We ask whether cognitive constraints limit the agents’ ability to achieve dispersion and, if there is dispersion, whether these constraints affect the mode by which agents achieve dispersion. Our main finding is that strategic interaction magnifies the role of cognitive constraints. Specifically, with cognitive constraints, pairs of agents fail to solve a dispersion problem that poses little or no problem for individual agents playing against themselves. When we remove the cognitive constraints in our design, pairs of agents solve the same problem just as well as individuals do. In addition, we find that when playing against themselves agents do not change the mode by which they solve the dispersion problem when our design removes the cognitive constraints.
 Coordination Game Coordination Problem Dispersion Problem Information Treatment Unique Optimal Solution

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