Book chapter
Experiences of Duration and Cognitive Penetrability
The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception, pp.188-212
Oxford University Press
03/12/2020
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190648916.003.0009
Abstract
This chapter considers the cognitive penetrability of our experiences of the durations of everyday events. It defends an account of subjective duration based in contemporary psychological and neurobiological research. It shows its philosophical adequacy by demonstrating its utility in explaining the phenomenology of duration experiences. The chapter then considers whether cognitive penetrability is a problem for these experiences. It argues that, to the contrary, the problem presupposes a relationship between perception and belief that duration perceptions and beliefs do not exhibit. Instead, the assignment of epistemic features to particular processing stages appears to answer to pragmatic needs, not psychological facts.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Experiences of Duration and Cognitive Penetrability
- Creators
- Carrie Figdor
- Resource Type
- Book chapter
- Publication Details
- The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception, pp.188-212
- DOI
- 10.1093/oso/9780190648916.003.0009
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press; New York
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/12/2020
- Academic Unit
- Iowa Neuroscience Institute; Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984065370102771
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