How Does Perception Justify Belief?1

RICHARD Fumerton

doi:10.4324/9780203123522-3

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Book chapter

How Does Perception Justify Belief?1

RICHARD Fumerton

Current Controversies in Epistemology, pp.37-54

Routledge

2014

DOI: 10.4324/9780203123522-3

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Abstract

I should start by pointing out that the title of this chapter is a compound question. It presupposes that perception does justify belief. I'm going to argue that there is no sense in which it is true that perception, by itself, justifies beliefs about physical objects and their properties.2 At best, perception, or, better, sensations, could play a role in justifying beliefs about the physical world only in conjunction with vast networks of justified background beliefs about prior sensations and beliefs about evidential connections justified by a priori reasoning.

Meta-cognitive Beliefs

Visual Sensation

Highdefinition Televisions

High Definition Televisions

Cloud Chamber

Easter Bunny

Vice Versa

Williamson's Argument

Intentional States

Causal Theory

Epistemic Conservatism

Phenomenal Conservatism

Tactile Sensation

Internal Twin

Visual Experience

Evil Demon Problem

Justify Belief

Epistemic Role

Agnostic

Apparent Memory

Veridical Experience

Richard Fumerton

Michael Huemer

Details

Title: Subtitle: How Does Perception Justify Belief?1
Creators: RICHARD Fumerton
Contributors: Ram Neta (Editor)
Resource Type: Book chapter
Publication Details: Current Controversies in Epistemology, pp.37-54
Publisher: Routledge
DOI: 10.4324/9780203123522-3
Language: English
Date published: 2014
Academic Unit: Philosophy
Record Identifier: 9984397183102771

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