Book chapter
In Defense of Rationalism about Abductive Inference
Best Explanations, pp.150-169
Oxford University Press
12/07/2017
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198746904.003.0010
Abstract
Laurence BonJour and more recently James Beebe have argued that the best way to defend the claim that abduction or inference to the best explanation is epistemically justified is the rationalist view that it is justified a priori. However, rationalism about abduction faces a number of challenges. This chapter focuses on one particular, highly influential objection, that there is no interpretation of probability available which is compatible with rationalism about abduction. The rationalist who wants to maintain a strong connection between epistemic justification and probability would do best to rely on a Keynesian interpretation of probability. However, the latter is vulnerable to Ramsey’s famous criticism that we do not seem to perceive or be aware of such probabilities. The chapter argues that Ramsey’s criticism is unsuccessful, and that there are good reasons to be optimistic about our ability to have access to probabilities relevant to abductive inference.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- In Defense of Rationalism about Abductive Inference
- Creators
- Ali Hasan
- Resource Type
- Book chapter
- Publication Details
- Best Explanations, pp.150-169
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press; Oxford
- DOI
- 10.1093/oso/9780198746904.003.0010
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/07/2017
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984397193202771
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