Book chapter
Infinitism
Ad Infinitum, pp.75-86
Oxford University Press
06/05/2014
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0005
Abstract
Questions concerning the structure of justification lie at the heart of epistemology. And it is to Peter Klein’s great credit that he has added to the traditional debates a new and interesting proposal for how to understand the structure of justification. The foundationalist is convinced that all justification terminates in a foundation of noninferential justification. The coherentist is convinced that there is no escaping the “circle of belief” and the best we can do is maximize relations of coherence among our beliefs. Klein’s infinitist rejects the choices offered by these two views as a false dilemma. Against the coherentist, we should insist that to have justification for believing any proposition we must have the capacity to put forward non-circular reasons in support of the proposition, non-circular reasons in support of whatever reasons we appeal to, non-circular reasons in support of those reasons and so on, ad infinitum. The foundationalist’s fear that this puts too much strain on finite beings is, Klein, argues, misguided. This chapter argues that the infinitist cannot avoid the foundationalist’s regress arguments. While it might be conceded that the infinitist has a plausible account of what it is for a belief to be defensible, it is not a plausible account of what it is for a belief to be justified.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Infinitism
- Creators
- Richard Fumerton
- Resource Type
- Book chapter
- Publication Details
- Ad Infinitum, pp.75-86
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press; Oxford
- DOI
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0005
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/05/2014
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984398442802771
Metrics
6 Record Views