Book chapter
Noisy juries and the choice of trial mode in a sequential signalling game: theory and evidence
Economics, law and individual rights, pp.303-327
2008
DOI: 10.4324/9780203930885-19
Abstract
The right to have one’s criminal liability determined by a jury of one’s peers has a long tradition in Anglo-American law.1 Although an accused has the right to a jury trial, it is often the case that he waives this right. In this article, we theoretically model the strategic exercise of this right by the defendant and examine the empirical implications of our paradigm for the trial process.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Noisy juries and the choice of trial mode in a sequential signalling game: theory and evidence
- Creators
- Gerald GayMartin F Grace - University of Iowa, FinanceJayant R KaleThomas H. Noe - University of Oxford
- Resource Type
- Book chapter
- Publication Details
- Economics, law and individual rights, pp.303-327
- DOI
- 10.4324/9780203930885-19
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 2008
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984701256002771
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