Book chapter
Private Language
The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein
Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy, Oxford University Press
10/27/2011
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199287505.003.0016
Abstract
Ludwig Wittgenstein's treatment of private language has received more attention than any other aspect of his philosophy. Yet, for more than fifty years, a remarkably self-contained exegetical tradition has defined the terms of debate and the principal positions that are discussed. Orthodox interpreters hold that the proof that a private language is impossible turns on showing it is ruled out by some set of systematic philosophical commitments about logic, meaning, and knowledge. Leading candidates for this ground on which the argument depends have included the analysis of concepts, the grammar of our everyday language, the logic of criteria, or the nature of our rule-following, practical activity, or form of life. This article introduces an alternative interpretive tradition, which not only rejects the orthodox methodology, but also rejects the presupposition that Wittgenstein's principal aim is to provide a deductive proof that the idea of a private language leads to contradiction. Finally, it examines some of the leading readings of Philosophical Investigations §258, the passage most frequently discussed by orthodox interpreters.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Private Language
- Creators
- David Stern - University of Iowa
- Contributors
- Oskari Kuusela (Editor) - University of East AngliaMarie McGinn (Editor) - Philosophy, University of York
- Resource Type
- Book chapter
- Publication Details
- The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Series
- Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy
- DOI
- 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199287505.003.0016
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 10/27/2011
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984397946202771
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