Wittgenstein’s critique of referential theories of meaning and the paradox of ostension: Philosophical Investigations §§26–48

David G Stern

doi:10.4324/9780203882573-17

Readers of Wittgenstein who take their orientation from reference works, elementary introductions or the canonical literature on his later work often take it for granted that there is relatively little positive philosophical argument in the Philosophical Investigations, and that the few main lines of argument-principally the rule-following considerations and the private language argument-play a purely negative, or critical, role. These, in turn, are typically construed as Wittgenstein’s principal weapons in a frontal attack on a single target, usually identiﬁed as the philosophy of the Tractatus, the Augustinian Picture, or the presuppositions that supposedly underlie traditional philosophy. However, reading Wittgenstein in this way, an approach that can ﬁnd strong support in not only the work of most of Wittgenstein’s constructively critical readers, such as Strawson or Kripke, but also the work of some of his most well-known sympathetic expositors, such as Malcolm or Hacker, does not do justice to the range and variety of the arguments at work, and the positions under discussion, in the Philosophical Investigations. The targets Wittgenstein takes on are much more varied, and much less monolithic, than they are usually supposed to be. On the reading advocated here, both the “straight” and the “sceptical” solutions to the paradoxes of rule-following are equally misguided if they are presented as an exposition of the author’s overall argumentative intentions, for they both misunderstand the character and methods of the Philosophical Investigations. They mistakenly identify the viewpoint defended in a particular strand of argument-in one case, the reasons Wittgenstein’s narrator gives us for thinking that the problem of rule-following can be solved, in the other, a skeptical problem that the narrator claims the interlocutor faces-as equivalent to the views that are advocated by the author, or the book as a whole. Wittgenstein, I contend, provided neither a straight solution nor a skeptical solution to the philosophical problems discussed in the Philosophical Investigations; rather, he aimed to dissolve those problems, by means of a dialogue between opposing voices. However, to dissolve an argument is not to dismiss it; an successful dissolution requires an intimate knowledge of the argumentative terrain if one is to convince one’s readers of the limitations of the particular arguments one criticizes. Consequently, Wittgenstein’s dialogues explores a much wider variety of arguments, and argumentative strategies, than the very limited range of positions and approaches usually discussed in the expository literature. Like Plato’s dialogues, they are simultaneously literary and philosophical, and the reader’s initial impression that the speakers and positions under discussion can be identiﬁed without much trouble should not be taken at face value. We shall see that it is a third voice in that dialogue, one which responds to that debate without endorsing either side, that comes closer to expressing the author’s viewpoint than either of his leading protagonists do. The principal concern of the Philosophical Investigations is not the speciﬁc arguments about rule-following or private language that have been the focus of most interpreters’ attention, but rather the larger argumentative strategies that inform them, and the very wide variety of quite particular trains of argument that are provided throughout the book. Once we appreciate this, we will also see that Wittgenstein’s work is directly relevant to a much broader range of current concerns.

Wittgenstein’s critique of referential theories of meaning and the paradox of ostension: Philosophical Investigations §§26–48

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