Conference proceeding
A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision & Control, pp.4700-4705
12/16/2024
DOI: 10.1109/CDC56724.2024.10885859
Abstract
We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in arriving too early as well as a risk in traveling alone. This gives rise to the possibility of the agents cooperating by traveling together while competing for the reward. In our prior work [1] we studied this problem as a sequential game among a set of N competing agents in continuous time, and defined the formation of a group traveling together as arriving at exactly the same time. In the present study, we relax this definition to allow arrival times within a small window, and study a 2 -agent game in both continuous and discrete time, referred to as the flock formation game. We derive and examine the properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking
- Creators
- Chenlan Wang - University of Michigan–Ann ArborMehrdad Moharrami - University of IowaMingyan Liu - University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
- Resource Type
- Conference proceeding
- Publication Details
- Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision & Control, pp.4700-4705
- Publisher
- IEEE
- DOI
- 10.1109/CDC56724.2024.10885859
- eISSN
- 2576-2370
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/16/2024
- Academic Unit
- Computer Science
- Record Identifier
- 9984798227302771
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