Conference proceeding
Assessing UAV Sensor Spoofing: More Than A GNSS Problem
Proceedings of the annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pp.1032-1046
12/09/2024
DOI: 10.1109/ACSAC63791.2024.00085
Abstract
Autonomous navigation systems present a unique attack surface: their sensors. This attack surface allows for sensor spoofing attacks, where an adversary gains control of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) by manipulating one of its sensors to report incorrect data. Prior research has shown that many of the sensors, including those on UAVs, are vulnerable to sensor spoofing attacks. However, most of the work on sensor spoofing either focuses solely on the vulnerability of the sensor or considers only the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) when attacking a UAV. The impact sensor spoofing has on UAVs and the extent of control an attacker can gain with different sensors is relatively unexplored. Concretely, we show that an adversary only needs to control one of the sensors a UAV uses for state estimation to control the UAV, even if the GNSS is faithful. We further characterize the extent of control an adversary can gain with each sensor and discuss why current defenses are insufficient to stop these attacks.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Assessing UAV Sensor Spoofing: More Than A GNSS Problem
- Creators
- Bailey Srimoungchanh - University of KansasJ. Garrett Morris - University of IowaDrew Davidson - University of Kansas
- Resource Type
- Conference proceeding
- Publication Details
- Proceedings of the annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pp.1032-1046
- Publisher
- IEEE
- DOI
- 10.1109/ACSAC63791.2024.00085
- eISSN
- 2576-9103
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/09/2024
- Academic Unit
- Computer Science
- Record Identifier
- 9984802409502771
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