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Morpheus: Bringing The (PKCS) One To Meet the Oracle
Conference proceeding   Open access

Morpheus: Bringing The (PKCS) One To Meet the Oracle

Moosa Yahyazadeh, Sze Yiu Chau, Li Li, Man Hong Hue, Joyanta Debnath, Sheung Chiu Ip, Chun Ngai Li, Endadul Hoque and Omar Chowdhury
CCS '21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp.2474-2496
CCS '21: 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Virtual Event, Republic of Korea, 11/15/2021–11/19/2021)
11/13/2021
DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3485382
Appears in  UI Libraries Support Open Access
url
https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485382View
Published (Version of record) Open Access

Abstract

This paper focuses on developing an automatic, black-box testing approach called MORPHEUS to check the non-compliance of libraries implementing PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification with the PKCS#1-v1.5 standard. Non-compliance can not only make implementations vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style RSA signature forgery attacks but also can induce interoperability issues. For checking non-compliance, MORPHEUS adaptively generates interesting test cases and then takes advantage of an oracle, a formally proven correct implementation of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature standard, to detect non-compliance in an implementation under test. We have used MORPHEUS to test 45 implementations of PKCS#1-v1.5 signature verification and discovered that 6 of them are susceptible to variants of the Bleichenbacher-style low public exponent RSA signature forgery attack, 1 implementation has a buffer overflow, 33 implementations have incompatibility issues, and 8 implementations have minor leniencies. Our findings have been responsibly disclosed and positively acknowledged by the developers.
 reference implementation adaptive combinatorial testing non-compliance checking PKCS#1 signature verification UIOWA OA Agreement

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