Dissertation
The weaponization of digital communication spaces: how authoritarian regimes use information control to suppress contention
University of Iowa
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
Autumn 2023
DOI: 10.25820/etd.006851
Abstract
Over the past two decades, internet and social media use has grown exponentially around the globe. The frequency of anti-government protests has also risen with protests becoming increasingly networked digitally, as protesters and activists use social media and digital technologies to organize mobilization, coordinate protests, and disseminate protest-related information. For authoritarian regimes, this ability of digital media to enable collective action poses a threat; popular uprisings are one of the main causes of regime change. Consequently, authoritarian states have adapted to this threat by increasing their use of digital tools for surveillance, censorship, and limiting connectivity. Digital technology, previously considered a democratization tool, is now also a tool for digital repression and information control.
In this dissertation, I seek to add to the discussion on the role of digital communication and information channeling for contentious politics in authoritarian regimes. I argue that autocrats seek information control in digital communication spaces to minimize the probability of contentious political actions, such as popular uprisings, protests, strikes, and demonstrations, because these actions are among the major threats to autocratic regime survival. Control of the information space allows them to minimize the amount of information that is critical of the regime and helps to fill in the information space with disinformation and pro-government propaganda instead. I investigate how different political actors seek to control, exploit, and manipulate information creation, its dissemination and consumption within digital communication spaces.
First, I show that individuals who use the internet and social media as a source of news are more likely to participate in contentious political actions, like demonstrations, strikes, and protests, whether they are in democratic or non-democratic countries. Second, I analyze vii information control mechanisms in autocracies by focusing on two cases of political contention in authoritarian regimes—the 2020-2021 protests in Belarus and the 2022 anti-war protests in Russia—and the messaging app Telegram as a digital communication space. The results suggest that pro-government actors in autocracies engage in information channeling to control information in digital communication spaces through rapid increases in activity to counteract communication by opposition actors, underreporting on domestic protests in comparison to protests abroad (agenda-setting), and adherence to the logic of the protest paradigm by covering protests and protesters in a degrading manner (negative framing of protests). These strategies contribute to an increased audience reach and provide the ability to frame domestic protests in a way that is advantageous to the regime, potentially swaying public opinion in favor of the government. In addition, I show that pro-government actors actively utilize their networks in response to contentious political action by disseminating information within the communication space, as the rates of in-community forwards increase significantly after the intervention events in both countries.
Overall, in autocracies, digital media can be a valuable tool for both opposition actors, as in the case of Belarus, and pro-government actors, as in the case of Russia, in establishing control of the information and political discourse online. The comparison between the two cases of contentious politics—in Belarus and Russia—and how the same digital communication space was used more effectively by different political actors highlights the dual nature of the internet and digital technologies that simultaneously enable collective action and provide opportunities for digital repression.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- The weaponization of digital communication spaces: how authoritarian regimes use information control to suppress contention
- Creators
- Daria Kuznetsova
- Contributors
- William M. Reisinger (Advisor)Caroline J. Tolbert (Committee Member)Elizabeth Menninga (Committee Member)Bryce Dietrich (Committee Member)Holli Semetko (Committee Member)
- Resource Type
- Dissertation
- Degree Awarded
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
- Degree in
- Political Science
- Date degree season
- Autumn 2023
- DOI
- 10.25820/etd.006851
- Publisher
- University of Iowa
- Number of pages
- xvi, 147 pages
- Copyright
- Copyright 2023 Daria Kuznetsova
- Language
- English
- Date submitted
- 11/30/2023
- Description illustrations
- illustrations, tables, graphs
- Description bibliographic
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 111-121).
- Public Abstract (ETD)
- The past two decades have seen a simultaneous increase in internet use and the frequency of anti-government protests around the globe. Today, protests are organized via social media and messaging apps—digital communication spaces that enable easy coordination and information sharing. This ability of digital communication spaces to aid protest organization poses a threat to autocracies, as popular uprisings are one of the main causes of regime change. This dissertation adds to the discussion on the role of digital communication in contentious politics, such as protests, strikes, and demonstrations, in authoritarian regimes. I argue that autocrats seek information control in digital communication spaces to minimize the probability of contentious political actions. By controlling the digital information space, autocrats can reduce information critical of the regime, disseminate disinformation and pro-government propaganda, and halt communication between protesters. The results show that as the use of social media as a source of news is positively associated with participation in contentious politics globally, progovernment actors in autocracies seek to establish control over digital communication spaces. However, the outcomes vary. By focusing on two cases of political contention in authoritarian regimes—the 2020-2021 protests in Belarus and the 2022 anti-war protests in Russia—and the messaging app Telegram, I find that Russian pro-government actors are more sophisticated in controlling and manipulating digital communication spaces than Belarusian pro-government actors. These differences highlight the dual nature of the internet and digital technologies that simultaneously enable collective action and provide opportunities for digital repression.
- Academic Unit
- Political Science
- Record Identifier
- 9984546750102771
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