Why do terrorists select the targets that they do? Existing explanations only provide a partial account. Here, I argue that terrorist organizations are concerned with two competing needs: that of public support and the achievement of their objectives. The interplay between these competing needs then helps to determine the selection of one of two types of targets, civilian or non-civilian. Following previous literatures, I place the terrorist organization in a bargaining interaction with a targeted government. I then condition this model by considering the role of three factors that can influence this interaction: government attributes, public support, and the group environment. I posit each to have an independent effect on targeting, conditioning which target types are prudent. These effects should also work jointly; with each conditioning the effect of the following. These factors then provide an account of terrorist targeting variation that explains why some groups eschew simplicity for symbolism
Dissertation
A rationalist explanation of terrorist targeting
University of Iowa
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
Summer 2010
DOI: 10.17077/etd.n91g63zx
Free to read and download, Open Access
Abstract
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A rationalist explanation of terrorist targeting
- Creators
- Stephen Charles Nemeth - University of Iowa
- Contributors
- Brian Lai (Advisor)Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (Advisor)John Conybeare (Committee Member)Paul Hensel (Committee Member)Stephen Vlastos (Committee Member)
- Resource Type
- Dissertation
- Degree Awarded
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
- Degree in
- Political Science
- Date degree season
- Summer 2010
- Publisher
- University of Iowa
- DOI
- 10.17077/etd.n91g63zx
- Number of pages
- x, 250 pages
- Copyright
- Copyright 2010 Stephen Charles Nemeth
- Language
- English
- Description bibliographic
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 227-250).
- Academic Unit
- Political Science
- Record Identifier
- 9983776883002771
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