Dignity and criminal law
Abstract
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Dignity and criminal law
- Creators
- David Harlan Babcock
- Contributors
- Jovana Davidovic (Advisor)Asha Bhandary (Committee Member)Richard Fumerton (Committee Member)Paul Gowder (Committee Member)Diane Jeske (Committee Member)
- Resource Type
- Dissertation
- Degree Awarded
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
- Degree in
- Philosophy
- Date degree season
- Spring 2022
- Publisher
- University of Iowa
- DOI
- 10.25820/etd.006518
- Number of pages
- vi, 103 pages
- Copyright
- Copyright 2022 David Harlan Babcock
- Language
- English
- Description bibliographic
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-103).
- Public Abstract (ETD)
Dignity is often defined as the inherent worth of individual humans and the respect this worth requires from other humans, both as individuals and collectively. I begin this project by showing that this worth and respect are recognized by law, and criminal law, in the very way in which they use ‘dignity’. I then give an explanation of how criminal law is able to respect individuals with dignity, while simultaneously purporting to regulate individual behavior with the use of punishment, two seemingly contradictory goals.
I claim that statutes of criminal law can be seen as regulating an individual’s behavior by the influence they carry as reasons which individuals use in their deliberations when they are considering behaving in ways prohibited by law. It is only individuals who are capable of action (directing their behavior with reasons) that are held responsible and punished for their behavior. Because criminal laws tie a consequence (e.g., $100 fine) to a general rule (e.g., don’t shoplift), any individual who chooses to break the rule, also chooses their punishment; and thus, their punishment can be considered as self-directed. In this way, criminal law recognizes and respects individual dignity by not interfering with this self-direction, the capability required by law for responsibility and thus punishment. Finally, I claim that, because of dignity’s worth, justifications of any current or proposed change to theory and/or practice of criminal law should include a consideration of how that law respects individual dignity.
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984270955702771