Most retail investors do not participate in shareholder voting due to the time, effort, and opportunity costs of voting. I examine what happens to companies when they are exposed to these investors’ voting behaviors. My analyses leverage decisions by Charles Schwab and TD Ameritrade to discontinue voting for routine proposals on behalf of retail investors who do not submit voting instructions. These changes led to a significant decline in the number of shares represented at shareholder meetings, making it more difficult for companies to meet voting requirements and approve certain proposals. In response, companies tried to be more proactive in encouraging retail investor voting, and some companies even introduced new ways to gain more control over voting outcomes. Companies with the strongest incentives to increase retail investor participation experience voting outcomes that diverge from management recommendations. My findings show that companies face real challenges and costs when fewer investors vote. My results highlight the challenges and costs associated with firm exposure to retail investors’ voting behaviors and are particularly relevant as such exposure is expected to increase.