Information manipulation and civil rebellion in autocratic regimes

Autocratic regimes are always under the threat of being overthrown by popular movements. Apart from violent repression, autocratic regimes have also largely adopted strategies to manipulate information in order to deter mass movements which may threat the regime. These strategies include ideology indoctrination, censorship, government propaganda, and more. Despite autocratic regimes’ multiple efforts, it is unclear whether these efforts can effectively reduce the number of anti-regime movements. This dissertation looks into autocratic regimes’ strategies of information manipulation with a focus on censorship and propaganda and attempts to answer the question of whether anti-regime movements are deterred by these strategies.

I argue that censorship and propaganda, as two measures of information manipulation in autocratic toolkits, may deter popular rebellion by either lowering citizens’ motives for social change or increasing the difficulty of mass mobilization. To test this argument, I use both cross-national time-series data from 2003 to 2018 on anti-regime movements in autocracies and a case study of China. I also test which mechanism is at work in the empirical analysis. Empirical evidence shows that media censorship, internet censorship, and propaganda all contribute to lower numbers of anti-regime movements in autocratic regimes, although the mechanism varies. Further, I use the Hong Kong 2019 protest to illustrate how an autocracy may manipulation information, promote its own political rhetoric, and compete with Western media’s storytelling and narratives.