Mediated theory: a new path forward for ideal and non-ideal theorists

Laura Brown

doi:10.25820/etd.007598

A debate in political philosophy–the contours and definition of which have been confused–is between whether political philosophers should do ideal theory. More generally, non- ideal theorists have asserted that ideal theory’s departure from the real world in its modeling choices reinforces oppression and have recommended that political philosophy abandon ideal theory. Many ways have been offered in distinguishing between ideal and non-ideal theory. One way to draw the distinction between the two types of theory is how the real world is modeled: ideal theorists’ models are less isomorphic with the real world in certain ways than the models offered by non-ideal theorists, with allegations by the non-ideal theorists that ideal theorists abstract from reality more profoundly than they do. Although I reject the binary between ideal and non-ideal theory, I focus on this delineation because it best highlights the alleged harm of ideal theory: deviation from certain realities. In this work, I examine how ideal theorists’ modeling choices cause epistemic harm through incorporating the values of dominant groups under the guise of neutrality. By applying a similarly fastidious analysis of non-ideal theorists’ modeling choices, I uncover numerous negative outcomes of being overly realistic while modeling, some of which also reinforce oppression. The critical error of non-ideal theory that non-ideal theorists immediately discount models on the basis of the values that have motivated their creation. I argue that non-ideal theorists prematurely discount models that may be liberatory or anti-oppressive on this basis. Although I am agnostic about whether ideal or non-ideal theory best mitigates—or, at least, does not reinforce—oppression, I offer a new way of considering how they are conceived out of, or reinforce, oppression, by introducing a better way to evaluate models: mediated theory. Mediated theory is a practice that occurs through model federation, with special consideration to how oppression affects models’ inputs and outputs. The friction inherent in this process allows political philosophers to be epistemically responsible. Finally, I consider the absence of disability in ideal models to practice model federation–or a way to make different models interoperable. If political philosophers are anti-oppressive—that is, committed to not reinforcing oppression through scholarship—mediated theory provides an important mechanism to be epistemically and socially responsible. In Chapter 1, I argue that the salient difference between ideal and non-ideal theory boils down to modeling choices. While non-ideal theorists purport that their models are more isomorphic to society—and, importantly, they model structural oppression—ideal theorists’ models are much scanter, modeling only what is deemed necessary to convey the point. Yet, the debate is confused because there is a lack of consensus on terminology to describe modeling choices. This chapter describes how models are constructed and how people learn from them, and defines key terminology regarding models. Charles Mills, a prominent non-ideal philosopher, has asserted that while non-ideal theory incorporates abstractions–defined as the harmless leaving out of certain details–ideal theory relies on “idealizations,” which are intentional, pernicious falsehoods about reality. Contributing to and synthesizing the literature that exists on abstractions and idealizations, I assert this delineation of abstractions and idealizations is confused. I coin a new term–”extreme, ineffective abstractions” (EIAs)–to refer to the sorts of modeling choices that non-ideal theorists are concerned with. However, I note that EIAs are not a reason to immediately discount certain models. Applying the sharpened terminology and framing of the debate that I offer in the prior chapter, Chapter 2 analyzes two of the model conceptions that John Rawls uses in A Theory of Justice: the person and the original position. In Mills’ seminal paper, Ideal Theory as Ideology, Mills provides a very long list of all of what he calls “idealizations” that Rawls makes. I find that many of these are better understood as EIAS. Aside from (what I term) EIAs being false, Mills worries that repeated use of these in modeling will cause us to think that (what I term) EIAs are real and will blind us to important contrary realities, thereby reinforcing oppression. I provide an analysis of Rawls’ ideal person who lacks race, gender, ability, or interconnectedness. While I raise non-ideal concerns for these modeling choices, I provide reasons for being skeptical about erasing these alleged EIAs. Next, I turn my attention to the original position, specifically the model of the veil of ignorance, and consider whether the veils should be thinner (non-ideal) or thicker (ideal). Although I admit that thinner veils have virtues, I maintain that thicker veils may still yield principles that are anti-oppressive. Mills has charged ideal theory with being harmful, and Chapter 3 aims to explicate these concerns. Modeling always creates a gap between the model and the thing itself. However, “ideal-as-idealized” models, according to Mills, model something that does not actually exist; yet the EIAs are not viewed as extreme or ineffective to the ideal theorists. This is because the modelers are “insiders,” or individuals who resemble and/or benefit from models based on the idealizations prevalent in the liberal tradition. The acceptance of EIAs as not being too distant from reality has resulted in two types of harms, according to Mills: real-world harm and epistemic harm. Real-world harm is defined as the harm that results in the real world when the model conceptions of ideal theory are uncritically applied. Epistemic harm arises from the wrongful conflation of the model conception and the actual. There are two types of epistemic harm: actively pernicious and passively pernicious. Actively pernicious epistemic harm refers to when ideal-as-idealized models are intentionally presented as being merely descriptive, knowing full well that they are full of EIAs. Passively pernicious epistemic harm removes intent–for instance, if an idealization is presented as a description for hypothetical purpose. Chapter 4 reveals shortcomings of non-ideal theory that could perpetuate injustice, lead to outputs that do not promote the rights of marginalized persons, and obfuscate systemic oppression. Non-ideal theorists have raised legitimate concerns about the harms of ideal theory, but they have not carefully considered the harms of non-ideal theory. As I explain, many of the problems that non-ideal theorists have raised with ideal theory are issues that also emerge from non-ideal theory. I look at several unintentional consequences of non-ideal theory, and conclude that non-ideal theory does not necessarily produce models and principles that promote the best representations of and outcomes for marginalized people. This reinforces my claim that we are much more likely to arrive at principles that promote an anti-oppression society by remaining as open as possible to the insights of all models. Mediated theory is presented in Chapter 5. First, I consider previous ways of determining which models to go with: looking at a modeler’s intentions or judging the idealizations. Then, I introduce mediated theory. Mediated theory promotes the generation of a multitude of theories, not one single theory. This is beneficial, as multiple models, with their variant modeling choices, can enable us to understand the same phenomenon in different ways. Synthesis is required in order to understand the multiple outputs of the models. A concept in computer science called “model federation” can aid in the synthesis. Crucially, while synthesis might yield one model, it might still yield multiple models. The friction that can arise from multiple models can be analogized to José Medina’s idea of “kaleidoscopic consciousness,” a dynamic, multifaceted awareness shaped by diverse perspectives that emphasizes the fluidity of understanding and the importance of integrating various viewpoints to achieve a more comprehensive, nuanced grasp of reality. This might cause political philosophers to be more epistemically responsible. In Chapter 6, I apply mediated theory to Rawls’ model conception of the original position. The original position has been criticized by non-ideal theorists for what I describe as EIAs. Disability theorists have contended that Rawls makes (what I term) an EIA that ideal persons are not disabled. Specifically, Rawls states that the severely disabled are not qualified to be representatives in the original position. This exclusion is something that disability theorists contend leads to principles that are oppressive towards the severely disabled. After I explain why Rawls excludes the severely disabled from the original position, I consider alternative non-ideal models to Rawls’ original position that include the severely disabled. Federating the resulting models, I unveil which values are at play. I conclude that values apparent in the ideal original position are more epistemically fruitful. Finally, I sketch a way to use the resultant models when considering justice for the severely disabled.

Mediated theory: a new path forward for ideal and non-ideal theorists

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