Dissertation
On the unity of moral and intellectual virtue
University of Iowa
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
Autumn 2025
Abstract
Throughout the twentieth century, epistemologists in the analytic tradition were broadly occupied with questions concerning the conditions necessary for the possession of knowledge, what counts as the sort of evidence that can confer justification on a belief, and so forth. Toward the end of the last century, however, some philosophers moved away from questions about the proper analysis and conditions for the proper attribution of knowledge and justified belief and turned their attention toward what it is about a person (or their character) that might make them a good thinker, knower, or more generally, a good epistemic agent. This shift in focus towards intellectual character has led epistemologists to look to virtue ethics as a guide for how to structure a virtue epistemology. The parallels between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have opened avenues for new discussions concerning, e.g. the unity of the intellectual virtues, the cultivation of intellectual character, and what role thinking well plays in leading a good life. While scholars in both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have considered the question of how individual virtues relate within their domain, few have considered whether and how intellectual character bears on moral character and vice versa. In recognizing this gap, I consider exactly this question: how do intellectual virtues relate to moral virtues? Ultimately, in this dissertation I argue that not only do the moral and intellectual domains interact, but they collapse into a singular virtue. That is, to be virtuous is to have an excellent moral and intellectual character.
In arguing for a Strong Unity of the virtues, I also argue that to properly possess virtue, one must possess it perfectly. While both the unity and perfection theses with regard to virtue may lead one to believe that the attainment of virtue is thereby hopeless, I offer a path forward. Taking virtue to be a model-concept, I argue that it has substantial pedagogical value, particularly for the burgeoning scholarly community concerned with character and virtue education. I conclude by sketching a pedagogical framework, which I call “Virtue Dialogue Theory” which points to the conceptual and pedagogical value of a fully unified, perfectionist understanding of virtue.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- On the unity of moral and intellectual virtue
- Creators
- Cassie L. Finley
- Contributors
- Ali Hasan (Advisor)Richard Fumerton (Committee Member)Diane Jeske (Committee Member)Carrie Swanson (Committee Member)
- Resource Type
- Dissertation
- Degree Awarded
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
- Degree in
- Philosophy
- Date degree season
- Autumn 2025
- Publisher
- University of Iowa
- Number of pages
- xv, 116 pages
- Copyright
- Copyright 2025 Cassie L. Finley
- Language
- English
- Date submitted
- 08/04/2025
- Description bibliographic
- Includes bibliographical references (page 112-116).
- Public Abstract (ETD)
Virtue theory and character education have seen something of a renaissance in the past fifty years or so. Of particular interest to philosophers today are the intellectual virtues features of someone s intellectual character that contribute to their being an excellent thinker. In developing theories of intellectual virtue, philosophers have looked to the well-established theories in virtue ethics for inspiration, which in turn raises age-old problems for contemporary intellectual virtues. Dating back at least to Socrates, we find philosophers wondering whether virtue is all-or-nothing. Can a person be excellent in one dimension of their life while falling short in another? Socrates suggests that the answer is, no ; to possess a moral virtue, you have to have them all, because there really is only one virtue. Philosophers call this the unity thesis. While Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all defend versions of a unity thesis, the unity of the virtues has fallen almost entirely out of favor among philosophers. After all, surely someone could be courageous while failing to be generous! Because the multiplicity of the moral virtues is the received position in virtue ethics, few have considered whether the intellectual virtues might be unified, let alone whether they might be unified with the moral virtues. In this dissertation I advocate for a strong version of the unity of the virtues thesis. What sets my project apart from other unity theories is that rather than limiting the scope of the unity to either moral or intellectual virtue, I deny the distinction between domains, arguing instead that there really is only one virtue. I do not deny that it is possible, and sometimes useful to conceive of, discuss, and distinguish between what we might think of as paradigm singular virtues. Rather, I deny that these individual conceptions track real distinctions between independently existing virtues.
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9985135148402771
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