The role of internal actors’ interests in UN arms embargo and the US arms sales policies

This dissertation seeks to understand why only some countries with human rights violations become the targets of military sanctions and arms trade restrictions. I suggest that the underlying political interests of actors within the UN Security Council and US Congress affect the UN targeted sanctions on arms transfers and congressional oversight efforts on arms exports respectively. First, I find that the alliance relationships between the permanent members of the UNSC and potential target countries have deterring effects on the impositions of UN arms embargoes. Regarding US arms exports, I find that congressional committees with jurisdiction over arms exports are more likely to propose joint resolutions to block arms sales plans when the recipient countries are non-democratic regimes with higher humanitarian violations. Lastly, by examining individual roll call votes of arms sales plans, I find that ideology and partisanship significantly influence the voting behavior of individual members in relation to financial contributions from defense contractors. My dissertation emphasizes the importance of both international (such as alliance) and domestic (such as partisanship and lobbying) interests by highlighting their influences over policy decisions of the UNSC and US Congress regarding their restriction efforts on arms transfers.