Towards a secure and accessible internet over IPV6

The Internet is undergoing a major shift with the adoption of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), a new protocol designed to mitigate the long-standing issue of IP address exhaustion. Unlike its predecessor, IPv4, which had a limited number of IP addresses, IPv6 offers a virtually unlimited address space. Although the expansive address space has its advantages, it has also introduced new challenges related to security and accessibility that remain poorly understood.

Most past research has largely focused on IPv4, as it was the dominant protocol for decades. However, the tools and techniques developed – to understand security/accessibility issues – for IPv4 are ineffective in IPv6 due to its vast address space. With the increasing adoption of IPv6, understanding its vulnerabilities has become more urgent. This thesis presents new, IPv6-specific methodologies to study two critical issues: Internet scanning and Internet censorship.

By investigating how malicious actors function in uncovering vulnerabilities in IPv6’s extensive address space, we produced security postures in order to harden our networks against potential compromises. Additionally, we examined how censorship mechanisms operate in IPv6 environments and how they differ from those in IPv4. These insights help us better understand both the risks and the opportunities introduced by IPv6 and how we can leverage them to circumvent censorship. As the internet continues its transition, ensuring a secure and open network requires adapting our approaches to match the scale and complexity of IPv6.