Dissertation
What am I?: a theory of self, informed by dissociative identity disorder
University of Iowa
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
Summer 2025
DOI: 10.25820/etd.008120
Abstract
The suggestion argued for in this dissertation is that no matter who is asking the What am I? question, the answer is always the same: a self. Throughout this dissertation, a new definition for ‘self’ is outlined: a psychocorporeal locus of agency. This definition of self builds on work from Eric Olson, Diana Meyers, and David Velleman, and the account is preferable to other traditional theories of self, which include no-self views (particularly reductive physicalist accounts of the self), body and brain criterion views, and psychological approaches. A major focus on this project is dissociative identity disorder (DID), because the experiences of human beings with DID inform a theory of self that is more accurate for those with DID and those without it. The experiences and accounts of individuals with dissociative identity disorder (DID) conflict with leading accounts of the self, which have tended to focus on the experiences and accounts of individuals who do not have DID.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- What am I?: a theory of self, informed by dissociative identity disorder
- Creators
- Danielle Bryn Colburn
- Contributors
- Carrie Figdor (Advisor)Asha L. Bhandary (Committee Member)Richard Fumerton (Committee Member)Katarina Perovic (Committee Member)Donald Black (Committee Member)
- Resource Type
- Dissertation
- Degree Awarded
- Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), University of Iowa
- Degree in
- Philosophy
- Date degree season
- Summer 2025
- DOI
- 10.25820/etd.008120
- Publisher
- University of Iowa
- Number of pages
- vi, 176 pages
- Copyright
- Copyright 2025 Danielle Bryn Colburn
- Language
- English
- Date submitted
- 05/21/2025
- Description illustrations
- Illustrations, graphs, charts
- Description bibliographic
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-176).
- Public Abstract (ETD)
The suggestion argued for in this dissertation is that no matter who is asking the What am I? question, the answer is always the same: a self. Throughout this dissertation, a new definition for self is outlined: a psychocorporeal locus of agency. This definition of self builds on work from Eric Olson, Diana Meyers, and David Velleman, and the account is preferable to other traditional theories of self, which include no-self views (particularly reductive physicalist accounts of the self), body and brain criterion views, and psychological approaches. A major focus on this project is dissociative identity disorder (DID), because the experiences of human beings with DID inform a theory of self that is more accurate for those with DID and those without it. The experiences and accounts of individuals with dissociative identity disorder (DID) conflict with leading accounts of the self, which have tended to focus on the experiences and accounts of individuals who do not have DID.
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984948642302771
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