This thesis investigated the factors that make states become revisionists but are understudied by the existing literature. Traditionally, scholars have investigated why states become revisionists from the system level, state level, and substate level. All these explanations assume a clear calculation of costs and benefits for states to take revisionist actions. But since state revisionist behaviors are very risky and the results are full of uncertainty, it is not enough by only investigating causes of state revisionism based on cost-benefit calculations for states. Instead, I draw on literature that studies why states and their leaders take risky behaviors even in front of highly uncertain conditions, which can deepen our understanding of revisionism and also bring us new insights. Specificallydomestic level of unrest and ethnic power-sharing as well as external support from the Great Powers greatly affect states’ revisionist tendencies. Under the pressure of domestic ethnic groups that have a higher level of power-sharing with the central government, with the increase of domestic unrest, state leaders may take aggressive foreign behaviors even with a moderate level of civil unrest. If such a state is supported by Great Powers, the likelihood of revisionist tendency is further increased. The first empirical paper finds that there is a curvilinear between domestic turmoil and the likelihood of initiating a diversionary conflict by state leaders. The second chapter finds that for states with institutions that include ethnic groups into the national government or grant them regional autonomy, with the increase of domestic turmoil, leaders are more likely to initiate diversionary conflict with other states. The third paper investigates the moral hazard problem at sea and finds that due to the unique feature of maritime issues such as initial claimants being favored by customary international law, potential challengers with great power support are more likely to have diplomatic maritime claims.