Rule of Law

Paul Gowder

doi:10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0197

The rule of law spans normative political philosophy and philosophy of law, as well as empirical political science and economics, and has a very small core of consensus and a very large periphery of disagreement. The general consensus among philosophers and lawyers essentially covers the propositions that it is (or is used as) a normative legitimacy criterion for a political state, and that it requires government officials to follow the law. It is often contrasted to the “rule of (wo)men”—the simple exercise of arbitrary power, as well as “rule by law”—the instrumental use of legal institutions by authoritarian rulers. Scholars disagree, however, about many fundamental questions about such matters as the relationship between the rule of law and private property rights, its compatibility with administrative law’s blending of executive and judicial powers, its relationship to the normative value and practical consequences of democracy, the extent to which the rule of law is consistent with legal indeterminacy, and whether or not a state must satisfy the rule of law, at least partially, to have law at all. In addition, there is a serious divergence between the rule of law literature in philosophy and law and the literature in economics, political science, and development practice. While both claim to be writing about the same concept, the concrete political realities that the two sets of literatures attach to it can be very different, with the latter often focusing more on concrete political institutions and economic arrangements rather than the core ideas of constraint of power. In the empirical literatures, most agree that the rule of law supports economic development, but there is much debate on how it is best measured and promoted. The references herein explore the many sides of these issues.

Rule of Law

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