Journal article
2 x 2 Games of Commitment in World Politics
International studies quarterly, Vol.33(1), pp.111-118
03/01/1989
DOI: 10.2307/2600496
Abstract
This note expands on a recent article in International Studies Quarterly by Maoz and Felsenthal (1987) that discusses self-binding commitment by actors in three different 2×2 games. I augment their work by adding nine more 2×2 games in which self-binding commitment can be beneficial. In the three games presented by Maoz and Felsenthal, only one party has an incentive to make a self-binding commitment, that commitment is to a dominated strategy, and the other party benefits from the commitment as well. In other situations, however, each of these three characteristics of the commitment tactic can be different. In addition, in nine of the twelve games of commitment, deadlock danger arises in which both players seek to be the only one to establish a self-binding commitment, but if both do so, both are worse off than in the absence of any commitment. Examining the incentives and disincentives to commit oneself in various situations is vital to understanding this important bargaining tactic.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- 2 x 2 Games of Commitment in World Politics
- Creators
- William M Reisinger
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International studies quarterly, Vol.33(1), pp.111-118
- Publisher
- Blackwell Publishing Ltd; Cary
- DOI
- 10.2307/2600496
- ISSN
- 0020-8833
- eISSN
- 1468-2478
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/01/1989
- Academic Unit
- Political Science; International Programs
- Record Identifier
- 9983988988202771
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