Journal article
A Critique of Phenomenal Explanationism
International journal for the study of skepticism
06/05/2026
DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10132
Abstract
This paper is a critical examination of Phenomenal Explanationism (PE), as defended in Kevin McCain’s Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems. I begin by discussing McCain’s characterization of PE as a kind of internalism, and the related question of what possession of evidence requires. I then examine the account of presentational appearances, argue that it overintellectualizes ordinary perceptual experience, and suggest a more phenomenologically apt picture in its place. I also examine McCain’s appreciation condition for doxastic justification, which is only briefly mentioned in the book but developed elsewhere, arguing that the account has counterintuitive results, and I raise a related difficulty regarding the justification of logical falsehoods. I then show that there is a gap in McCain’s argument against memory skepticism that the skeptic can exploit. Finally, I question whether skeptical hypotheses carry the asymmetric theoretical commitments McCain attributes to them.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A Critique of Phenomenal Explanationism
- Creators
- Ali Hasan - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International journal for the study of skepticism
- DOI
- 10.1163/22105700-bja10132
- ISSN
- 2210-5697
- eISSN
- 2210-5700
- Publisher
- Brill
- Language
- English
- Electronic publication date
- 06/05/2026
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9985175376602771
Metrics
1 Record Views