A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm and Wilfred C. Uecker

Journal of accounting research, Vol.23(2), pp.81-120

01/01/1985

DOI: 10.2307/2490691

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no abstract

Adverse Effects

Delivery costs

Market prices

Modeling

Moral hazard

Moral hazard models

Price changes

Private investigation

Service quality assurance

Unit costs

Title: Subtitle: A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship
Creators: Douglas V. DeJong
Robert Forsythe
Russell J. Lundholm
Wilfred C. Uecker
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Journal of accounting research, Vol.23(2), pp.81-120
DOI: 10.2307/2490691
ISSN: 0021-8456
eISSN: 1475-679X
Publisher: The Institute of Professional Accounting, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Number of pages: 40
Language: English
Date published: 01/01/1985
Academic Unit: Accounting
Record Identifier: 9984963136402771

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