Journal article
A Neo-Armstrongian Defense of States of Affairs: A Reply to Vallicella
Metaphysica (Dettelbach, Germany), Vol.17(2), pp.143-161
09/01/2016
DOI: 10.1515/mp-2016-0010
Abstract
Vallicella’s influential work makes a case that, when formulated broadly, as a problem about unity, Bradley’s challenge to Armstrongian states of affairs is practically insurmountable. He argues that traditional relational and non-relational responses to Bradley are inadequate, and many in the current metaphysical debate on this issue have come to agree. In this paper, I argue that such a conclusion is too hasty. Firstly, the problem of unity as applied to Armstrongian states of affairs is not clearly defined; in fact, it has taken a number of different forms each of which need to be carefully distinguished and further supported. Secondly, once we formulate the problem in more neutral terms, as a request for a characterization of the way that particulars, universals, and states of affairs stand to one another, it can be adequately addressed by an Armstrongian about states of affairs. I propose the desiderata for an adequate characterization and present a neo-Armstrongian defense of states of affairs that meets those desiderata. The latter relies on an important distinction between different notions of fundamentality and existential dependence.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A Neo-Armstrongian Defense of States of Affairs: A Reply to Vallicella
- Creators
- Katarina Perovic - Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Metaphysica (Dettelbach, Germany), Vol.17(2), pp.143-161
- Publisher
- De Gruyter
- DOI
- 10.1515/mp-2016-0010
- ISSN
- 1437-2053
- eISSN
- 1874-6373
- Number of pages
- 19
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/01/2016
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984002423702771
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