Journal article
A Note on Welfare in the Durable-Goods Monopoly
Economica (London), Vol.56(224), pp.523-527
11/01/1989
DOI: 10.2307/2554327
Abstract
Depending upon the shape of the rental demand curve facing a durable-goods monopolist, social welfare may be raised or lowered by requiring the monopolist to sell, rather than rent, its output. Indeed, the equilibrium under rentals may Pareto-dominate the equilibrium under sales.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A Note on Welfare in the Durable-Goods Monopoly
- Creators
- David A. MaluegJohn L. Solow
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economica (London), Vol.56(224), pp.523-527
- DOI
- 10.2307/2554327
- ISSN
- 0013-0427
- eISSN
- 1468-0335
- Publisher
- London School of Economics and Political Science
- Number of pages
- 5
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/01/1989
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963536302771
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