Journal article
A duration estimator for a continuous time war of attrition game
Political science research and methods, Vol.9(4), pp.760-778
10/2021
DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2020.29
Abstract
Abstract We developed a maximum likelihood estimator corresponding to the predicted hazard rate that emerges from a continuous time game of incomplete information with a fixed time horizon (i.e., Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Journal of Economic Theory27, 253–279). Such games have been widely applied in economics and political science and involve two players engaged in a war of attrition contest over some prize that they both value. Each player can be either a strong or weak competitor. In the equilibrium of interest, strong players do not quit whereas weak players play a mixed strategy characterized by a hazard rate that increases up to an endogenous point in time, after which only strong players remain. The observed length of the contest can therefore be modeled as a mixture between two unobserved underlying durations: one that increases until it abruptly ends at an endogenous point in time and a second involving two strong players that continues indefinitely. We illustrate this estimator by studying the durations of Senate filibusters and international crises.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A duration estimator for a continuous time war of attrition game
- Creators
- Frederick J BoehmkeDouglas DionCharles R Shipan
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Political science research and methods, Vol.9(4), pp.760-778
- DOI
- 10.1017/psrm.2020.29
- ISSN
- 2049-8470
- eISSN
- 2049-8489
- Language
- English
- Electronic publication date
- 07/06/2020
- Date published
- 10/2021
- Academic Unit
- Political Science; Public Policy Center (Archive)
- Record Identifier
- 9983982715002771
Metrics
33 Record Views