A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

Rabah Amir; Igor V. Evstigneev

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010

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A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

Journal article

Peer reviewed

A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

Rabah Amir and Igor V. Evstigneev

Games and economic behavior, Vol.109, pp.99-103

05/01/2018

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010

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Abstract

The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature.

Non-monotonic demand

Price competition

Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium

Weakly dominated strategy

Details

Title: Subtitle: A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly
Creators: Rabah Amir - University of Iowa
Igor V. Evstigneev - University of Manchester
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Games and economic behavior, Vol.109, pp.99-103
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010
ISSN: 0899-8256
eISSN: 1090-2473
Publisher: Elsevier Inc
Language: English
Date published: 05/01/2018
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380509002771

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