Journal article
A remark on discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity
Economic theory bulletin, Vol.5(1), pp.119-126
04/01/2017
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0100-5
Abstract
We consider discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity (i.e., players have maximin preferences
à la
Gilboa and Schmeidler (
1989
)). It is shown that the existence of equilibria follows directly from the existence of Nash equilibria in every ex post game if all players are endowed with the maximin preferences. This is false for discontinuous games where players have Bayesian preferences as shown in He and Yannelis (
2015a
).
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A remark on discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity
- Creators
- Wei He - University of IowaNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory bulletin, Vol.5(1), pp.119-126
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- DOI
- 10.1007/s40505-016-0100-5
- ISSN
- 2196-1085
- eISSN
- 2196-1093
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 04/01/2017
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380731002771
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