Journal article
A strategic market game with complete markets
Journal of economic theory, Vol.51(1), pp.126-143
06/01/1990
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90054-N
Abstract
An exchange economy is modeled as a strategic market game with all pairwise markets available. Existence of noncooperative equilibria is proved. It is shown that if resources are distributed in a skewed manner, in equilibrium prices may not satisfy the no arbitrage condition. One round of trade even with all goods serving as money is not sufficient to provide enough liquidity for efficient trade
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- A strategic market game with complete markets
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - Stony Brook UniversitySiddharta Sahi - Princeton UniversityMartin Shubik - Yale UniversityShuntian Yao - Yale University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.51(1), pp.126-143
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90054-N
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/01/1990
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380515602771
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