Journal article
ASSOCIATIVE OBLIGATIONS, VOLUNTARISM, AND EQUALITY
Pacific philosophical quarterly, Vol.77(4), pp.289-309
12/1996
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.1996.tb00172.x
Abstract
:
Samuel Scheffler has identified two important objections to associative obligations, the voluntarist objection and the distributivist objection. The voluntarist is concerned about protecting the autonomy of the agent who is supposed to have associative obligations. However, the appropriate account of the source of associative obligations reveals that they pose no threat to autonomy, if we understand autonomy in a weak rather than a strong sense. The distributivist is worried about the claims of outsiders being ignored as the result of insiders having associative obligations to one another. This objection loses much of its force when we understand the genuine implications of associative obligations.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- ASSOCIATIVE OBLIGATIONS, VOLUNTARISM, AND EQUALITY
- Creators
- Diane Jeske - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Pacific philosophical quarterly, Vol.77(4), pp.289-309
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-0114.1996.tb00172.x
- ISSN
- 0279-0750
- eISSN
- 1468-0114
- Number of pages
- 21
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/1996
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984397949902771
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