Adverse Selection and Long-Term Hazards: The Choice between Contract and Mandatory Liability Rules

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Steven N. Wiggins and Al H. Ringleb

The Journal of legal studies, Vol.21(1), pp.189-215

01/01/1992

DOI: 10.1086/467904

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Bankruptcy

Bank liabilities

Bodily injury liability

Business structures

Corporate liability

Financial liabilities

Legal liability

Occupational hazards

Strict liability

Wages

Title: Subtitle: Adverse Selection and Long-Term Hazards: The Choice between Contract and Mandatory Liability Rules
Creators: Steven N. Wiggins
Al H. Ringleb
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: The Journal of legal studies, Vol.21(1), pp.189-215
Publisher: The University of Chicago Law School
DOI: 10.1086/467904
ISSN: 0047-2530
eISSN: 1537-5366
Language: English
Date published: 01/01/1992
Academic Unit: Management and Entrepreneurship ; Interdepartmental Progs
Record Identifier: 9984380638902771

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