Journal article
Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets
The Geneva risk and insurance review, Vol.39(2), pp.222-253
09/01/2014
DOI: 10.1057/grir.2014.13
Abstract
This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry-and therefore, its negative consequences-decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of U. S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners during the period 1993-2012. We find that the amount of reinsurance, insurer profitability, and insurer credit quality all increase with the tenure of the insurer-reinsurer relationship.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets
- Creators
- James R. Garven - Baylor UniversityJames I. Hilliard - Northern Arizona UniversityMartin F. Grace - Georgia State University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The Geneva risk and insurance review, Vol.39(2), pp.222-253
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1057/grir.2014.13
- ISSN
- 1554-964X
- eISSN
- 1554-9658
- Number of pages
- 32
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/01/2014
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984700656102771
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