Agency and Consciousness

David Cunning

doi:10.1023/A:1005192006642

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Journal article

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Agency and Consciousness

David Cunning

Synthese (Dordrecht), Vol.120(2), pp.271-294

01/01/1999

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005192006642

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Abstract

In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing is always a component of one's action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle's view to establish that there are actions in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility.

Acting

Bodily awareness

Cartesianism

Causality

Causation

Consciousness

Cunning

Humans

Intentionality

Phenomena

Details

Title: Subtitle: Agency and Consciousness
Creators: David Cunning - University of California, Irvine
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Synthese (Dordrecht), Vol.120(2), pp.271-294
Publisher: Kluwer Academic Publishers
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005192006642
ISSN: 0039-7857
eISSN: 1573-0964
Language: English
Date published: 01/01/1999
Academic Unit: Philosophy
Record Identifier: 9984397944502771

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