Journal article
Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
Economic theory, Vol.63(1), pp.233-261
01/01/2017
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y
Abstract
In a partition model, we show that each maximin individually rational and ex ante maximin efficient allocation of a single good economy is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. When there are more than one good, we introduce three conditions. If none of the three conditions is satisfied, then a maximin individually rational and ex ante maximin efficient allocation may not be implementable. However, as long as one of the three conditions is satisfied, each maximin individually rational and ex ante maximin efficient allocation is implementable. Our work generalizes and extends the recent paper of de Castro et al. (Games Econ Behav 2015. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010).).
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Creators
- Luciano I. de Castro - University of IowaZhiwei Liu - Capital University of Economics and BusinessNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, Vol.63(1), pp.233-261
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- eISSN
- 1432-0479
- Number of pages
- 29
- Grant note
- 71571122 / NSFC; National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) humanities university project of China University of Political Science and Law Research and Innovation Centre of Metropolis Economic and Social Development, Capital University of Economics and Business
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/2017
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380548402771
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