Journal article
Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games
The American economic review, Vol.95(3), pp.477-509
06/01/2005
DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201431
Abstract
We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding “truth-wins” norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games
- Creators
- David J Cooper - Case Western Reserve UniversityJohn H Kagel - The Ohio State University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The American economic review, Vol.95(3), pp.477-509
- DOI
- 10.1257/0002828054201431
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- eISSN
- 1944-7981
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/01/2005
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420838302771
Metrics
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