Journal article
Audit committee financial expertise and earnings management: The role of status
Journal of accounting & economics, Vol.58(2-3), pp.208-230
11/01/2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.08.006
Abstract
Regulatory pressure to increase both audit committee financial expertise and board independence has resulted in lower status for audit committees relative to management. This status differential is relevant because expertise and relative status are important determinants of each party's ability to influence outcomes, particularly when parties face conflicting goals. We find that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative status are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as measured by accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. These results speak to benefits and limitations of financial expertise, which have been the focus of considerable debate. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Audit committee financial expertise and earnings management: The role of status
- Creators
- Patrick G. Badolato - The University of Texas at AustinDain C. Donelson - The University of Texas at AustinMatthew Ege - University of Florida Health
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of accounting & economics, Vol.58(2-3), pp.208-230
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.08.006
- ISSN
- 0165-4101
- eISSN
- 1879-1980
- Number of pages
- 23
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/01/2014
- Academic Unit
- Accounting; Law Faculty
- Record Identifier
- 9984380444802771
Metrics
4 Record Views