Journal article
Bare Particulars Laid Bare
Acta Analytica, Vol.32(3), pp.277-295
09/2017
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-016-0308-x
Abstract
Bare particulars have received a fair amount of bad press. Many find such entities to be obviously incoherent and dismiss them without much consideration. Proponents of bare particulars, on their part, have not done enough to clearly motivate and characterize bare particulars, thus leaving them open to misinterpretations. With this paper, I try to remedy this situation. I put forward a much-needed positive case for bare particulars through the four problems that they can be seen to solve—The Problem of Individuation, The Problem of Change, The Problem of Having a Property, and The Problem of Subtraction. I then distinguish and characterize three possible types of bare particulars—genuinely bare, constitutively bare, and thinly clothed—and consider how each of these cope with some classical and recent objections to bare particulars. I argue that the most troubling objections do not come from familiar quarters, but from examining how well such entities address all four of the ontological problems outlined. I ultimately conclude that the best contenders among the three types of bare particulars are the constitutively bare variety, but argue that, if they are to earn their keep, they must either share or turn over their individuating role to the ordinary particulars that they constitute.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Bare Particulars Laid Bare
- Creators
- Katarina Perović - Department of Philosophy University of Iowa 270 English-Philosophy Building Iowa City IA 52242 USA
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Acta Analytica, Vol.32(3), pp.277-295
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands; Dordrecht
- DOI
- 10.1007/s12136-016-0308-x
- ISSN
- 0353-5150
- eISSN
- 1874-6349
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/2017
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984002596002771
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