Journal article
CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses
Journal of financial economics, Vol.73(1), pp.119-143
07/01/2004
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.002
Abstract
We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses
- Creators
- Yaniv Grinstein - Cornell UniversityPaul Hribar - Cornell University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial economics, Vol.73(1), pp.119-143
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.002
- ISSN
- 0304-405X
- eISSN
- 1879-2774
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 07/01/2004
- Academic Unit
- Accounting
- Record Identifier
- 9984380512002771
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