Journal article
Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections
Economics and politics, Vol.10(3), pp.185-217
11/1998
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00044
Abstract
If (often costly) election campaigns are simply advertising, they do not increase social welfare directly. Given this, should we limit campaign expenditures? We propose that costly campaigns can inform voters about the strength of candidates. This may increase welfare indirectly by helping voters avoid coordination failures. In laboratory elections, we study campaign finance levels as coordinating signals and compare them with our earlier work on polls. Both coordinate majority voters effectively, allowing them to stop Condorcet losers from winning. Finance levels were rational in that the total benefits of coordination exceeded the costs. Further, benefits of typical incremental contributions exceeded costs ex-post, while the next typical increment's benefits would not have.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections
- Creators
- Thomas RietzRoger Myerson - University of IowaRobert Weber - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economics and politics, Vol.10(3), pp.185-217
- DOI
- 10.1111/1468-0343.00044
- ISSN
- 0954-1985
- eISSN
- 1468-0343
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/1998
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984380394502771
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