Journal article
Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.45(9), pp.559-575
09/20/2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.003
Abstract
This paper considers a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions of indivisible objects. The model allows for interdependent values, multidiminensional types and any attitude towards risk. Assuming only optimal behavior, we prove that each bid is chosen in order to equalize the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of bidding. This generalizes many existing results in the literature. We use this characterization to obtain sufficient conditions for truthful bidding, monotonic best reply strategies and identification results for multi-unit auctions.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions
- Creators
- Luciano I. de Castro - University of Illinois Urbana-ChampaignAlvaro Riascos - Universidad de Los Andes
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.45(9), pp.559-575
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.003
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- eISSN
- 1873-1538
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/20/2009
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380435402771
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