Journal article
Coalition structure values in differential information economies: is unity a strength?
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.39(1), pp.51-62
02/01/2003
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00083-6
Abstract
The coalition structure (CS) value, introduced by Owen [G. Owen, Values of games with a priori unions, in: Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1977] and Hart and Kurz [Econometrica 51 (1983) 1047], generalizes the Shapley value to social situations where coalitions form for the purpose of bargaining. This paper introduces the CS value to economies with differential information. We show that the private CS values exists and is Bayesian incentive compatible. Moreover, we construct examples that go against the intuitive viewpoint that “unity is strength”. In particular, we consider a three-person economy in which two agents bargain as a unit against the third agent. We show that bargaining as a unit is advantageous if and only if information is complete. This result sheds new light on bargaining under differential information.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: is unity a strength?
- Creators
- Stefan Krasa - University of Illinois SystemAkram Temimi - University of AlabamaNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Illinois System
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.39(1), pp.51-62
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00083-6
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 02/01/2003
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380383602771
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