Journal article
Coalitional Bayesian Nash Implementation in Differential Information Economies
Economic theory, Vol.18(2), pp.485-509
09/01/2001
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004196
Abstract
A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash Implementation in Differential Information Economies
- Creators
- Guangsug HahnNicholas C. Yannelis
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, Vol.18(2), pp.485-509
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- DOI
- 10.1007/PL00004196
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- eISSN
- 1432-0479
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/01/2001
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380495002771
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